The Sun Hits the Earth at Ten Thousand Times

An energy deep dive: what's real, what's coming, and who decides what abundance is for

Essays on democratic ownership & shared abundance

April 2026

Sunlight strikes the earth's surface at roughly ten thousand times the rate of human energy consumption. That single fact should end every serious argument about energy scarcity. It does not, because the argument was never really about physics. It was about who controls the infrastructure between the sun and your wall outlet.

As we consider the domains of scarcity and potential abundance, energy is primary because energy is the foundation — the one from which food, water, shelter, health, and education all follow. If a family can generate and store its own power, everything else becomes possible. If it cannot, everything else remains a dependency.

We are going to be specific. Real numbers, real projects, real obstacles. And then we are going to ask the question that most energy analysis leaves out: Who owns the abundance?

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I. The Cost Curves

Wind, solar, and batteries are not fuels. They are technologies. That distinction changes everything. Fossil fuel prices are volatile — subject to geopolitics, extraction costs, depletion, and speculation. Technology costs follow learning curves. Every time cumulative production doubles, the cost falls by a predictable percentage. For solar, that rate has been roughly twenty percent per doubling for over four decades. The cost decline has been exponential, and it shows no sign of stopping.

The numbers as of early 2026 are remarkable. The global average cost of utility-scale solar electricity is approximately four cents per kilowatt-hour. In sun-rich regions — parts of the Middle East, North Africa, India, and the southwestern United States — it drops to three cents, making solar the cheapest new electricity source ever measured, anywhere. Solar panel efficiency has climbed from roughly seventeen percent a decade ago to above twenty-three percent in today's best commercial modules, with laboratory tandem cells pushing toward thirty. The global cost of solar has fallen more than eighty percent since 2010.

Onshore wind has followed a parallel path, with costs down roughly seventy percent over the same period. In the U.S. and Canada, wind has displaced gas as the cheapest source of new-build electricity generation.

Lithium-ion battery costs have fallen approximately ninety percent since 2010. In February 2026, BloombergNEF reported a record low benchmark cost of $78 per megawatt-hour for a four-hour utility-scale battery system — cheaper than building a new gas-fired plant in most markets. Combined solar-and-storage systems are now delivering power at an average of $57 per megawatt-hour, and those costs are continuing to fall.

These are not projections. These are the measured findings of the International Renewable Energy Agency, BloombergNEF, and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory. The debate about whether renewables can compete with fossil fuels is over. Renewables won. The debate that matters now is about what happens next.

Every argument about energy scarcity is now an argument about politics, not physics. The sun is not the bottleneck. The bottleneck is who controls the wire.

II. The Storage Revolution

The oldest objection to solar and wind is intermittency: the sun goes down, the wind stops, and you need something to fill the gap. For decades, that something was fossil fuel baseload — coal and gas plants running around the clock. The intermittency argument was real, and it was the strongest card the fossil fuel industry held.

That card is being taken off the table.

Lithium-ion batteries have already solved the short-duration problem. A four-hour battery can shift midday solar surplus to the evening peak. At $78 per megawatt-hour and falling, that's economically competitive with gas peaker plants in most markets. But lithium-ion has limitations: it is too expensive for multi-day storage, it relies on lithium and cobalt supply chains with their own political and environmental complications, and it degrades over thousands of cycles.

Three technologies are converging to solve what lithium-ion cannot.

Iron-air batteries. Form Energy, operating out of a 550,000-square-foot factory in Weirton, West Virginia — built on the site of a former steel mill — is manufacturing batteries that store electricity for a hundred hours at roughly one-tenth the cost of lithium-ion. The technology works by reversible rusting: iron pellets react with oxygen from the air to produce electricity; the process reverses when the battery charges. The materials are iron, water, and air. No heavy metals. No thermal runaway risk. Highly recyclable. In the first months of 2026, Form Energy signed a billion-dollar deal with Google for a 30-gigawatt-hour system in Minnesota — the largest battery deployment ever announced globally by energy capacity — and a 12-gigawatt-hour agreement with AI infrastructure developer Crusoe, with deliveries beginning in 2027. The company has also announced its first international project in Ireland. Their pipeline now exceeds 75 gigawatt-hours under contract, and their first commercial system is delivering power.

The round-trip efficiency of iron-air batteries is lower than lithium-ion — roughly forty to sixty percent versus ninety percent. Critics cite this as a weakness. But Form Energy's argument is sound: the value of hundred-hour storage is not in daily energy trading. It is in surviving the multi-day weather events — the cold, calm, overcast stretches that the German grid planners call Dunkelflaute — that are the last real vulnerability of a renewable-dominant grid. When the materials cost almost nothing, a lower efficiency rate is a tolerable trade for days of stored power.

Some mainstream energy analyses place long-duration storage breakthroughs in the 2040s. This is like placing the automobile in the 1920s while Ford is already selling the Model T. The technology is not aspirational. It has an address in West Virginia and a shipping schedule.

Sodium-ion batteries. CATL, the world's largest battery manufacturer, is aggressively scaling sodium-ion battery production in 2026. Sodium is vastly more abundant and cheaper to extract than lithium. The batteries are heavier per unit of energy stored, which matters in vehicles but not at all in a stationary battery farm sitting in a field. Market projections anticipate 400 gigawatt-hours of sodium-ion manufacturing capacity by 2030. For grid-scale and community-scale storage, sodium-ion removes the lithium supply-chain vulnerability entirely and promises to drive overnight storage costs even lower.

Enhanced geothermal. Geothermal energy has historically been limited to volcanic zones — Iceland, parts of the American West, the East African Rift. Enhanced Geothermal Systems change that equation by using horizontal drilling techniques adapted from the oil and gas industry to fracture hot rock and create artificial reservoirs anywhere the earth's crust is hot enough — which, at sufficient depth, is nearly everywhere. Fervo Energy's 500-megawatt Cape Station project in Utah is expected to begin delivering power to the grid later this year. If enhanced geothermal scales, it provides something neither solar nor wind can: clean, dispatchable, 24/7 baseload power that doesn't depend on weather at all. It is the complement that makes a fully renewable grid not just possible but robust.

The last serious technical argument against full renewable self-sufficiency — "what do you do when the sun doesn't shine for three days?" — is being answered not with theory but with rust, sodium, and drilled rock.

III. The Architecture Question

Here is where most energy analysis stops. It describes the cost curves, catalogs the technologies, projects a timeline, and concludes that the transition is underway. And it is. But it leaves the most important question unasked: whose transition?

The default architecture of the energy transition looks exactly like the architecture it is replacing. Giant solar farms instead of giant coal plants. Giant battery installations instead of giant gas turbines. Giant transmission lines carrying power hundreds of miles from where it's generated to where it's consumed. The scale changes. The fuel changes. The ownership structure does not. The same utilities, the same grid operators, the same investor-owned infrastructure stands between the sun and the family that needs the light.

The optimistic version of this future — and it is genuinely offered by smart analysts — goes like this: energy becomes so cheap that your electric bill evolves into something like an internet subscription. A flat monthly fee for grid access and maintenance, with the energy itself bundled in for nearly free. You don't worry about kilowatt-hours any more than you worry about individual data packets. The lights are on. The system works. You pay your bill.

That vision is comfortable. It is also, from the standpoint of democratic ownership, a nightmare. It is the subscription model applied to the most fundamental resource of civilized life. You are a customer. You receive a service. You do not own the infrastructure, elect the board, set the rates, or decide what the surplus energy is used for. The floor on your electric bill — the part that "will likely never be zero" — is not a law of physics. It is a business model. It is the rent charged by the people who own the wire.

The "floor" on energy costs is not physics. It is a business model. It is the rent charged by the people who own the wire between the sun and your home.

IV. The Other Architecture

There is another way to build an energy system, and its logic is as old as the garden and as new as the solar panel on the roof.

A family installs solar on its own home. Today, in the United States, that costs roughly $30,000 before incentives for a twelve-kilowatt system — a significant sum, but one that pays for itself within seven to ten years through energy savings, and then generates free electricity for the remaining fifteen to twenty years of the panels' life. As module efficiency climbs and manufacturing scales, that cost continues to fall. In many states, even after the expiration of the 30% federal tax credit at the end of 2025, solar is already cash-flow positive against rising utility rates from the first month when financed through a lease or power purchase agreement.

Add a home battery. Lithium-ion today, perhaps sodium-ion or a smaller iron-air unit tomorrow as those technologies move from utility scale to community and household scale. The family now has power through the night and through short outages. It is no longer fully dependent on the grid.

Now connect that household to its neighbors. A community microgrid — a local energy network that can operate independently of the central grid — shares surplus generation, balances loads, and provides collective resilience. When one home's panels are shaded, another's are in full sun. When one family's battery is depleted, the neighborhood's collective storage covers the gap. AI-optimized management can balance generation, storage, and consumption across dozens or hundreds of homes in real time.

Scale that to a community with its own long-duration storage — an iron-air installation the size of a few shipping containers, capable of powering a neighborhood for days. This is not a utility-scale megaproject. It is infrastructure that a community land trust, a housing cooperative, a municipal authority, or a neighborhood association can own and govern.

The family that generates its own power is a family that cannot be coerced by the people who control the grid. The community that owns its own energy infrastructure is a community that sets its own priorities. The neighborhood that can ride out a three-day storm without calling the utility is a neighborhood that has moved from dependency to self-determination.

This is not a fantasy. It is being built right now in communities around the world. What it needs is not a technological breakthrough — the technology exists. What it needs is financing, policy support, and the political will to challenge the utility monopoly model that treats distributed generation as a threat rather than a public good.

V. The Grid Bottleneck — And Why It's an Argument for Distributed Power

One of the great ironies of the current energy transition is that the centralized model is choking on its own success. Thousands of megawatts of approved renewable capacity are sitting in interconnection queues — sometimes waiting years — because the transmission infrastructure cannot absorb them. Building a giant wind farm in New Mexico is relatively straightforward. Building the 885-kilometer high-voltage transmission line to carry that power to California, as the $11 billion SunZia project is doing, takes a decade of permitting, land acquisition, environmental review, and political negotiation.

This bottleneck is real and it is not going away quickly. Transmission infrastructure is the slowest, most politically contested, most capital-intensive part of the energy system. Every mile of new high-voltage line crosses someone's property, someone's jurisdiction, someone's political territory.

But notice what this argument implies. If the grid cannot absorb all the centralized renewables being built, then putting generation closer to consumption — on rooftops, in neighborhoods, in community-scale installations — is not romantic. It is practical. It is faster to permit, faster to build, and it doesn't require a new transmission line across three states. Distributed generation doesn't compete with the grid. It relieves it.

The most resilient energy system is not one giant network or millions of isolated homesteads. It is a network of networks — local microgrids that can operate independently when they need to and connect to the larger grid when it serves them. This is the architecture of the coral reef: distributed, relational, self-sustaining at the local level, interconnected at the system level. No single point of failure. No single point of control.

VI. The Leapfrog

Most energy analysis is written from the perspective of wealthy nations with existing grid infrastructure. The question it asks is: how do we transition the grid we have? That question matters. But it is not the only question, and for much of the world it is not even the most important one.

There are regions — across sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Central America, the Pacific Islands — where the centralized grid has never arrived and may never arrive. Where the choice is not between fossil fuel baseload and renewable generation, but between no electricity at all and a solar panel on the roof. For these communities, the distributed model is not an alternative to the grid. It is the grid.

We have seen this pattern before. Mobile phones did not arrive in much of Africa as a replacement for an existing landline network. They leapfrogged the landline entirely. Hundreds of millions of people went from no telephone to a smartphone in their pocket, skipping the century of copper wire that the industrialized world had to build and maintain. Mobile banking — M-Pesa in Kenya, its descendants across the continent — leapfrogged the branch banking system entirely.

Energy is poised for the same leap. A village in rural Nigeria that installs a community solar microgrid with battery storage is not transitioning from fossil fuels. It is arriving at energy for the first time — and arriving at a version of energy that is cleaner, cheaper, more resilient, and more locally governed than what the industrialized world built over a century. Nigerian homes and businesses are already switching from diesel backup generators to solar in growing numbers. They are not waiting for their country's grid to arrive. They are building their own.

This is where the new agrarian vision is most immediately achievable and most urgently needed. And it is where the ownership question is starkest. Will these communities own their energy infrastructure, or will it be owned by foreign investors and development banks who extract returns while the community pays rent? The answer depends on financing models, governance structures, and political choices being made right now.

A village that builds its own solar microgrid is not waiting for the future. It is building the future — and building a version that the industrialized world should be learning from.

VII. The Overbuilding Insight

One of the most important ideas in current energy economics deserves to be understood more widely, because it changes how you think about abundance itself.

Solar panels and wind turbines are becoming so cheap to manufacture that it will soon be — and in some markets already is — more economical to deliberately build far more generating capacity than you actually need than to build expensive storage to cover every possible shortfall. Build 150% or 200% of your required solar capacity. On bright spring days, when generation exceeds demand, simply curtail the excess — turn off panels that aren't needed.

This sounds wasteful. It is the opposite of wasteful. It is the logic of abundance applied to infrastructure planning. When the marginal cost of generation is nearly zero, "waste" loses its meaning. The sun doesn't charge you for the photons you didn't collect.

And here is where it gets transformative: the excess energy — the surplus that would otherwise be curtailed — becomes the raw material for industries that were previously too energy-intensive to be affordable. Massive water desalination, powered by surplus solar, can turn seawater into fresh water at costs that make it viable for agriculture and drinking in coastal regions around the world. Vertical farming, powered by surplus renewables, can grow food in controlled environments independent of climate, soil, and season. Green hydrogen, produced by electrolysis during hours of excess generation, can fuel heavy shipping and industrial processes that electricity alone cannot reach.

This is the economics of surplus. Not scarcity management — abundance management. And it raises the question that The People's Share exists to ask: who manages the surplus? If overbuilt solar fields produce excess energy at midday, does that energy go to a community desalination plant that produces free drinking water for a coastal city, or does it go to a data center owned by Google? Both are possible. Both are already happening. The difference is governance.

VIII. Who Owns the Abundance?

Form Energy's two largest contracts are with Google and Crusoe, an AI infrastructure company. This is not a coincidence. The AI industry is the most energy-hungry new sector on the planet, and it is moving faster than any other to secure dedicated power supplies outside the traditional grid. Data center developers are signing multi-billion-dollar energy deals, building their own power plants, and locking up renewable capacity that might otherwise serve the public grid.

The technology that could liberate households is currently being scaled to power the compute layer of the intelligence age. That is not inherently wrong. AI infrastructure needs energy, and it is better that the energy come from iron-air batteries and solar farms than from gas turbines. But it is a choice being made by capital, not by communities. And it reveals the deepest pattern of the energy transition: the cost curves are democratic — they fall for everyone — but the deployment is not. The first gigawatt-hours of iron-air storage are going to the entities with the most capital, the fastest procurement, and the closest relationships with manufacturers. Communities will get what's left, when they can afford it, if the policy environment allows it.

This is not inevitable. It is a political arrangement, and political arrangements can be changed. Community energy trusts, municipal utilities, rural electric cooperatives, public power authorities — these are existing institutional forms that can own, finance, and govern distributed energy infrastructure. What they need is access to the same financing mechanisms, the same tax incentives, and the same procurement pipelines that are currently flowing to corporate buyers. What they need, in many states, is the removal of regulatory barriers that actively prevent communities from building their own microgrids or selling power to their own neighbors.

The People's Share will document these barriers state by state, policy by policy, and name the interests that maintain them. The technology to power every household with clean, self-generated, community-governed energy is here. The political structures that prevent it from reaching the people who need it most are identifiable, and they are changeable.

The cost curves are democratic — they fall for everyone. But the deployment is not. The first gigawatt-hours go to the entities with the most capital. Communities get what's left. That arrangement is political, not physical — and political arrangements can be changed.

IX. What Comes Next

The household energy system. What does a fully integrated home energy setup look like today — solar, storage, smart management — and what does it cost, region by region, with and without incentives? What are the financing models that make it accessible to families who don't have $30,000 in cash? What does the math look like when you factor in twenty-five years of avoided utility bills?

The community microgrid. What are the existing models — from Brooklyn Microgrid to rural electric cooperatives to off-grid African villages — and what governance structures do they use? How do you finance community-owned energy infrastructure? What regulatory barriers stand in the way, and who benefits from those barriers?

The policy landscape. Which states and countries are leading on distributed energy, and which are actively obstructing it? What does utility monopoly law look like in practice? Who sits on the public utility commissions, and who funds their campaigns?

The Global South leapfrog. Where is distributed solar already replacing the grid that never arrived? What can the industrialized world learn from communities that built their energy systems from scratch?

The surplus economy. When energy is overbuilt and the marginal cost approaches zero, what becomes possible? Desalination, vertical farming, green hydrogen, direct air capture — what does the economics of surplus mean for water, food, and climate?

Each of these must get the treatment it deserves: real numbers, real projects, real obstacles, real strategies. Not confectionery. Not forecasts dressed up as facts. The evidence, and the argument for what the evidence demands.

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A family that generates its own power is a family that has taken the first step out of dependency and into self-determination. A community that owns its own energy infrastructure has claimed the foundation on which every other form of abundance is built. This is the autotroph — the organism that makes its own energy from light. It is the oldest strategy of life on earth, and it is the newest possibility of human civilization.

The sun hits the earth at ten thousand times. The technology to harvest it is here and falling in cost every year. The question is not whether energy abundance will arrive. It is whether it will arrive as a subscription service owned by the same powers that have always owned the wire — or as a commons, generated and governed by the people who stand in the light.

Sources referenced include data from the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), BloombergNEF's 2026 Levelized Cost of Electricity report, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), Form Energy's public disclosures and press releases, Fervo Energy's project announcements, and Carbon Brief's ongoing energy analysis. All figures are drawn from publicly available sources current as of April 2026.